BRC-237 Transactions

Payment Evidence Statements for BREAD and BEEF

This BRC defines a payment evidence statement, a small canonical JSON object in which a receiver records what it verified about an unmined payment and what it did not: the ancestors anchored by a Merkle path to a header it trusts, whether every input reaches one, the longest and shortest unconfirmed distance to an anchor, which unconfirmed transactions passe

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Abstract

This BRC defines a payment evidence statement, a small canonical JSON object in which a receiver records what it verified about an unmined payment and what it did not: the ancestors anchored by a Merkle path to a header it trusts, whether every input reaches one, the longest and shortest unconfirmed distance to an anchor, which unconfirmed transactions passed script, amount and lock-time checks, and the payment's observed status. A receiver that reports ancestry distance, as BREAD does, and a receiver that holds a BEEF can each make one from the evidence it already has. No statement says that a payment will be mined. The BRC also converts Electrum-form Merkle branches to BRC-74 paths and defines an optional signature and wallet method.

Motivation

Two kinds of evidence are in use for a payment that is not yet mined.

The first is ancestry distance. The receiver walks back from the payment through its unconfirmed ancestors until it reaches a transaction with a Merkle path to a block header, and reports the number of steps. The number records distance; which checks were run is a separate fact. ElectrumSVP's release notes for version 0.2.0-beta.1 describe evidence of this kind under the name BREAD: "Improved BREAD verification, including local proof-data handling, unconfirmed transaction verification, confirmed-ancestor anchoring, hop reporting, and BREAD JSON export". Its 0.2.0 release notes expand the name as Blockchain Referenced Evidence and Data.

The second is BEEF (BRC-62, with the Atomic form of BRC-95 and the V2 form of BRC-96), which carries unconfirmed ancestors back to transactions with BRC-74 Merkle paths. With it, a receiver can run every script, check every signature, and check that each transaction's inputs cover its outputs, the checks that BRC-67 lists for simplified payment verification. When it does, the result answers whether every spend from those coins to the payment is valid. The BEEF alone does not say whether a receiver ran those checks, or against which headers.

Neither kind of evidence answers whether the payment will be mined, or whether a conflicting spend of one of its inputs exists. Those depend on what miners do next. A receiver can look for a conflicting spend at a given moment, through a node it runs or a service it asks, and that observation is the most it can hold.

Each kind of evidence is described in its own terms today. "Three hops" and "a valid BEEF" may describe the same payment, and neither phrase alone lists the checks behind it. A statement in common terms lets:

  • a user see what their wallet checked before they hand over goods;
  • an application apply one acceptance policy, whichever wallet serves it;
  • a wallet of either kind report what it knows, without adopting the other kind's format or architecture.

Scope and conformance

Layer. Interface: what one program tells another about a payment, whether wallet to application, wallet to user or wallet to wallet. Whether to accept a payment is policy, and this document does not set it.

Three roles are used, and a MUST binds only an implementation that claims the role its sentence names:

  • a maker produces statements (sections 2 to 4, 6 and 7);
  • a reader reads them (section 5);
  • a wallet that offers the method of section 8, which that section binds.

Adoption is voluntary. A wallet that makes no statements does not follow this document, and its other behaviour is unaffected.

What this document does not require. How a maker obtains its material or its block headers; how it stores anything; which transport carries a statement; whether a maker validates at all (a statement whose validation is "none" conforms); whether and how it checks for a conflicting spend; the values of its bounds and of a reader's; and the BRC-100 interface, which section 8 uses optionally. A statement is self-contained: reading it needs no service and no key, and checking its anchors needs only block headers.

The key words MUST, MUST NOT, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT and MAY are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 and RFC 8174 when, and only when, they appear in capitals.

Specification

1. Terms

  • Payment: the transaction a statement is about.
  • Txid: the double SHA-256 of a transaction's bytes. Inside a transaction, a BEEF, an Atomic BEEF's prefix and a BRC-74 path, a txid is in internal byte order, the order the hash gives; in a statement, and in this document's tables, it is 64 lowercase hexadecimal digits in display order, the reverse. A maker MUST compute every txid from the bytes it holds. An input names the transaction it spends by txid in internal byte order, and the maker matches it against the txids it computed in that same order. A txid written beside the bytes is a claim.
  • Material: what the maker holds of the payment's ancestry, of one of two kinds: a BEEF as received (BRC-62 V1, 0100beef, or BRC-96 V2, 0200beef, alone or inside a BRC-95 Atomic BEEF), or raw transactions and Merkle paths from the maker's own records. A statement is made over one material.
  • Header source: the block headers the maker trusts, by height, and its tip, the highest of them; the source holds the tip's header. How the maker obtains them is outside this document. Every anchor is only as good as this source (see Security Considerations).
  • Median time past: the median of the timestamps (bytes 68 to 71 of the 80-byte header, little-endian) of the 11 blocks ending at the header source's tip, that is the tip and the 10 blocks below it. A maker whose header source lacks one of those headers has no median time past.
  • Merkle path: BRC-74 bytes. In a BEEF, a path counts for a transaction only when that transaction's entry names its index: BRC-62's has-BUMP byte 01 and index, or BRC-96's format 01 and index. In records, a path is held for a txid, as BRC-74 bytes or as an Electrum-form branch (section 6).
  • Own path: for a txid at offset x of level 0 of a path of tree height h (the lowest such offset, if the txid is at more than one), the h steps that fold it. At step i, from 0 to h - 1, the working hash and its sibling, the node at offset (x >> i) XOR 1 of level i, are hashed together, the left node first, as the double SHA-256 of their 64 bytes. The sibling is the hash the path gives at that offset, the working hash again where the path marks that offset a duplicate (flag 01), or the node computed from the two nodes below it. The working hash starts as the txid and its last value is the root. A step with no sibling ends the fold with no root, and a txid that is not at level 0 has no own path. A one-transaction block is the exception: a path of tree height 1 that holds one node, the txid at offset 0, has no step, and its root is the txid.
  • Anchor: a transaction the maker holds, with a Merkle path that (a) gives a root by the fold of the transaction's own path, which takes exactly the path's tree height of steps, or none for a one-transaction block; (b) names a height at or below the header source's tip at which the header source holds a header; (c) gives a root equal to the Merkle root of that header (bytes 36 to 67 of the 80-byte header, in internal byte order); (d) is for a transaction that is not exactly 64 bytes long; and (e) at no step of the own path hashes 64 bytes, the two nodes in the order hashed, that decode as a transaction. Any field carried with the material that asserts confirmation, a height or a header included, is a claim, and is not evidence of an anchor.
  • Decodes as a transaction, for 64 bytes: read in the standard transaction serialization, they give, ending exactly at byte 64, a 4-byte version; an input count of at least 1; each input as a 32-byte txid, a 4-byte index, a script length and that many bytes, and a 4-byte sequence number; an output count of at least 1; each output as an 8-byte value, a script length and that many bytes, with every value, and the running sum of the values, at most 2,100,000,000,000,000; and a 4-byte lock time. Counts and lengths are VarInts, in any of their forms.
  • Unconfirmed set U: the transactions the walk of section 2.1 reaches that are not anchors. The payment is in U unless it is itself an anchor.
  • Unresolved input: an input of a transaction in U whose source transaction the maker does not hold.

2. Making a statement

2.1 The walk

The maker starts at the payment and visits each transaction once, in whatever order the material holds them. It reads the Merkle path of each visited transaction that has one, as BRC-74 permits (below). A path that meets condition (b) of an anchor is checked as one (section 1), and its transaction is not followed further. A path that does not meet condition (b), because it names a height above the tip or one for which the header source holds no header, is not checked: the maker treats its transaction as if it carried no path. Every other visited transaction joins U, and each of its inputs is followed to the transaction it spends, or recorded as unresolved if the maker does not hold that transaction. The inputs come from the held bytes, never from anything carried beside them. The maker decodes only the transactions the walk visits. It reads the rest of the material only as far as its framing needs and, in an Atomic BEEF, as far as each entry's txid and the outpoints its inputs name, to tell an ancestor from an unrelated entry. Framing a BEEF reads every path in it, and a node's flag sets the node's length, so a path that holds a flag other than 00, 01 or 02 cannot be framed: it is MALFORMED whether or not a visited transaction names it.

A BEEF V2 entry that carries only a txid holds no transaction, so an input that spends it is unresolved. BRC-96 treats such an entry as valid by agreement between the parties exchanging the BEEF, and that agreement is not evidence a statement records. A maker that holds the transaction MAY make its statement from its records instead.

An Atomic BEEF that lacks an ancestor is material here. BRC-95 fails the validation of such an Atomic BEEF; a maker reads it, and the statement names the inputs that are unresolved. A statement about it does not say that it passes BRC-95 validation. BRC-95's other rules apply as written: the subject, the 32 bytes after the prefix read in internal byte order, is the payment, and the material holds the subject and its ancestors and nothing else. An ancestor is any entry the material holds whose txid an input of the subject, or of another ancestor, names, an anchor's inputs included. A transaction beyond an anchor is therefore an ancestor: BRC-95 permits it, the byte bound counts it, and the walk does not visit it. An entry that carries only a txid has no inputs, so it names no further ancestor, and one whose txid no such input names is unrelated, as an unrelated transaction is.

A maker MUST refuse, with the code given, and return no statement:

Code When
MALFORMED Material that does not decode completely: bytes missing or left over (a decoder is told its input is complete). A BEEF whose version is not 0100beef or 0200beef, so the legacy efbe0001 too. An Atomic BEEF whose subject is not the payment, or that holds an entry other than the subject and its ancestors, an entry that carries only a txid included. A BEEF that holds one txid twice. A path in a BEEF that holds a flag other than 00, 01 or 02, whether or not a visited transaction names it. A payment not in the material. Bytes whose txid differs from the txid they are held under. A transaction in U with no inputs or no outputs. An input naming an output that its held source does not have. A path of a visited transaction that BRC-74 does not permit (below).
ANCHOR_MISMATCH A Merkle path that meets condition (b) of an anchor fails condition (a), (c), (d) or (e). The transaction is not treated as unconfirmed instead.
CONFLICT Two inputs of transactions in U spend the same output, within one transaction or across two; or a transaction in U spends an output that an anchor the walk reached also spends.
OVER_BOUND The maker reads more bytes than its bound: for a BEEF, its whole length, with any Atomic prefix, since the maker frames all of it; for records, the bytes of each transaction the walk visits and of the path held for each of those, as BRC-74 bytes (an Electrum-form branch as converted), and nothing else the records hold. Or the walk reads more transactions, anchors and U together, than its bound; or the longest path through U holds more transactions than its bound on distance. Or the statement, in its canonical form (section 4), is longer than the maker's bound on statement length.

A path that BRC-74 does not permit is one with a tree height of 0 or more than 64; a flag other than 00, 01 or 02; two nodes at one offset of a level; a node outside the tree, at an offset of 2^(h - i) or more at level i of a tree of height h; or a node, given as a hash or as the duplicate of its sibling, that differs from the node computed from the two nodes below it. These are checked on the path of every visited transaction, whether or not it meets condition (b), and the flags on every path of a BEEF, since framing reads them. Nodes off a transaction's own path take part in these checks and in nothing else.

A maker MUST have all four bounds and MUST refuse beyond them, never describe part of a graph. It MUST NOT emit a statement longer than its bound on statement length, and refuses OVER_BOUND instead. Their values are policy. A maker SHOULD use 1,000,000 bytes as its bound on statement length, the value section 5 recommends for a reader's bound, so that a reader with that bound reads every statement a maker with it emits.

After a reorganisation that replaces the block a path names, the header source holds another header at that height, and material that holds the path is refused ANCHOR_MISMATCH (condition c) until its path is replaced.

2.2 Anchoring and distance

  • fullyAnchored is true when no input is unresolved.
  • distanceMax, when the payment is fully anchored, is the number of transactions of U on the longest path from the payment back to an anchor. It is 1 when every input of the payment spends an anchor's output, and 0 when the payment is itself an anchor. It is null when the payment is not fully anchored.
  • distanceMin is the number of transactions of U on the shortest path from the payment back to an anchor, whether or not the payment is fully anchored. It is 0 when the payment is itself an anchor, and null when no path reaches an anchor.

A path's number of transactions of U equals its number of edges from the payment to the anchor: for a chain D, C, B, A in which D spends C, C spends B, B spends A and only A is anchored, both distances are 3.

2.3 Validation

A transaction X of U is validated when the maker has run each check below on X and on every transaction of U that X descends from, and every check passed. Only a transaction whose ancestry is fully anchored can be validated, because the checks read the outputs it spends.

  1. Scripts. For each input, the unlocking script followed by the locking script of the output it spends evaluates to true under the consensus rules in force for the block after the header source's tip. Some of those rules depend on the height at which the spent output was created: for an output that an anchor created, the height of the anchor's block, and for an output that a transaction of U created, the block after the tip, as SV Node judges an output created in its mempool (validation.cpp L2667-L2674 and L2692-L2696). On mainnet the Genesis upgrade activated at height 620,538 and the Chronicle upgrade at 943,816 (SV Node chainparams.cpp L18-L23); for example, OP_2MUL is enabled for an output created at or above 943,816 and disabled for one created below it (interpreter.cpp L360-L372). A maker whose next block is below an upgrade's activation height applies the rules from before it. This check includes every signature check (BRC-67 step 1).
  2. Amounts. Each output's value, and the sum of X's outputs, is from 0 to 2,100,000,000,000,000 satoshis, and the outputs X spends add up to at least the sum of its outputs. BRC-67 step 2 asks for more than the outputs, as a stand-in for a fee rate. This check asks only that no value is created, and section 2.4 reports the fee.
  3. Lock time. X can be mined in the block after the header source's tip as it stands: its nLockTime is 0; or every input's sequence number is 0xFFFFFFFF; or its nLockTime is below 500,000,000 and below that block's height; or its nLockTime is 500,000,000 or more and below the median time past (section 1). An input that spends an output of an anchored coinbase transaction does so only if that block's height is at least the coinbase's height plus 100, the network's coinbase maturity (SV Node consensus.h L75). An input that spends an output of an anchored transaction whose first output's locking script begins 006a0463667478 (OP_FALSE OP_RETURN and a push of cftx), a confiscation transaction (frozentxo_db.cpp L614-L636), does so only if that block's height is at least the anchor's height plus 1,000 (consensus.h L79, validation.cpp L2627-L2636). Before Genesis, the relative lock times of BIP 68, set by each input's sequence number, also bound a transaction of version 2 or above (validation.cpp L272-L273 and L3463-L3468, policy.h L247-L255); a maker whose next block is below the Genesis activation height applies them too. BRC-67 step 4 asks that nLockTime and each nSequence be set to the values the receiver expects. This check asks only whether X can be mined in the next block; which values a receiver expects is its policy.

Only a check that ran under the consensus rules and failed is a refusal, and the maker then returns no statement:

Code When
SCRIPT_FAILED Check 1 ran, and an evaluation ended false or broke a consensus rule.
VALUE_CREATED Check 2 fails.
PREMATURE Check 3 fails: X cannot be mined in the next block as it stands. This does not find X invalid. A transaction whose lock time is still to come may be meant to be replaced before then, as in the payment channels of BRC-9 step 9, and a statement can be made once a later tip lets check 3 pass.

A maker MUST NOT refuse because of a limit it sets for itself, such as a bound on a script's memory, operations or number length, or because of a stricter rule it applies for its own use. When the maker cannot complete a check on a transaction, it MUST leave that transaction, and every transaction of U that descends from it, out of the validated set, and MUST NOT refuse because of it. It cannot complete a check when its interpreter does not implement an opcode the script uses under the rules in force, or treats it otherwise than those rules do (as disabled, as invalid or as doing nothing); when an evaluation reaches one of its own limits; when a lock time needs a median time past it does not have; or when check 3 needs a relative lock time and the maker does not implement those. Nor can it complete the checks on a transaction of U whose own first output's locking script begins 006a0463667478: that is a confiscation transaction, which SV Node accepts only when it is whitelisted (validation.cpp L2562-L2587), and a maker cannot know the whitelist. A maker MAY also leave out a transaction that passes these checks but not a stricter check of its own, and it need not check a transaction that descends from one it left out. A statement records only checks that passed: a maker MUST NOT count as validated a transaction whose checks were not all completed.

A maker that ran a check and found that it failed MUST refuse. It MUST NOT then report that transaction as not checked, or make a distance-only statement about the same payment from material that holds it, while the failure stands; for PREMATURE, that is until a later tip lets check 3 pass.

validated lists the validated transactions. validation is "all" when the payment is fully anchored and every transaction of U is validated, "none" when U is not empty and no transaction is validated, and "partial" otherwise. A maker that runs no checks reports "none", and conforms. A payment that is itself an anchor has an empty U, so its validation is "all" whether or not the maker validates: the checks of this section apply to U, so both kinds of maker have run the same checks on such a payment, and both make the same statement.

When more than one refusal applies, a maker MAY report any of them.

2.4 Fee

lowestFeeRate covers validated transactions only. It is the fee and size of the validated transaction whose fee per byte is lowest, as {"bytes": size, "satoshis": fee}, where the fee is what its inputs spend less what its outputs pay, and the size is the length of its bytes. Among equal rates it is the one with the smallest txid. It is null when no transaction is validated. Two integers carry the rate without rounding. Whether the rate is enough for a miner is policy.

2.5 Status and observations

status is {"depth": d, "event": e}, where e is the event furthest down this table among those the maker observed for the payment, whatever order it observed them in:

event Meaning depth
received The maker holds the payment, from another party. null
signed-locally The maker signed the payment itself. null
handed-to-broadcaster The maker gave the payment to a broadcaster. null
seen-by-network A node or service reported holding the payment among its unmined transactions. null
mined The payment is itself an anchor. tip.height less the anchor's height, plus 1

A maker MUST say mined when the payment is itself an anchor, and MUST NOT say it otherwise, whatever it was told.

conflicts is {"checked": false}, or a check the maker made for a conflicting spend:

{"at": t, "checked": true, "found": f, "kind": k, "scope": s}
  • at: when the observation was made, in Unix seconds, no later than madeAt.
  • found: true if a transaction other than those in U was observed spending an output in scope.
  • kind: own-node, a node the maker operates, or third-party, a node or service operated by another party.
  • scope: payment, the outputs the payment's own inputs spend, or unconfirmed, the outputs spent by every transaction of U.

How the observation is made is operation, and outside this document. found: false says only that none was seen at time at.

madeAt is when the statement was made, in Unix seconds.

tip is {"blockHash": b, "height": n}: the header source's tip when the statement was made, and the double SHA-256 of its header in display order. Every depth and lock-time verdict in the statement is for that tip: check 3 was made for the block at n + 1.

3. The statement

A statement is a JSON object with exactly these fields:

Field Type Value
anchors array One {"blockHash", "height", "txid"} per anchor the walk reached, sorted by txid. blockHash is the double SHA-256 of the header the path reached, in display order.
conflicts object Section 2.5.
distanceMax integer or null Section 2.2.
distanceMin integer or null Section 2.2.
fullyAnchored boolean Section 2.2.
lowestFeeRate object or null Section 2.4.
madeAt integer Section 2.5.
status object Section 2.5.
tip object Section 2.5.
txid string The payment.
unconfirmed array The txids of U, sorted.
unresolved array One {"txid", "vout"} per unresolved input, the output it spends, sorted by txid and then by vout.
validated array The txids of the validated transactions, sorted.
validation string none, partial or all (section 2.3).
version string bsv-payment-evidence/v1

Every txid and block hash is 64 lowercase hexadecimal digits, in display order. Every array is in strictly ascending order of the strings and integers named, so no txid (or txid and vout) is in it twice.

4. Canonical form

A statement is exchanged as the bytes of its canonical form:

  • keys sorted by their bytes at every level, with no whitespace and the separators , and :;
  • integers in decimal, from 0 to 2^53 - 1, with no sign, leading zero, fraction or exponent; there are no other numbers;
  • strings only from the values of section 3, so no character is ever escaped; null, true and false as JSON writes them;
  • the whole encoded as ASCII.

This is the canonical form of BRC-179 section 7.2, extended with integers and null as above. A maker MUST emit it.

5. Reading a statement

A reader has a bound on the length of the bytes it reads. Its value is policy, and a reader SHOULD use 1,000,000 bytes, the value section 2.1 recommends for a maker's bound on statement length. A reader MUST, in this order:

  1. refuse OVER_BOUND if the bytes are longer than its bound, before it parses them;
  2. refuse MALFORMED_STATEMENT unless the bytes are ASCII, nest arrays and objects at most 32 deep (the outermost object is depth 1), and parse as a JSON object, with no key twice in one object, whose version is a string;
  3. refuse UNKNOWN_VERSION if version is not bsv-payment-evidence/v1, and read no further;
  4. refuse MALFORMED_STATEMENT if the bytes are not the canonical form of the object they parse to; if a field is missing, unexpected or of the wrong type (a boolean is true or false, never a number); if a txid or block hash is not 64 lowercase hexadecimal digits; if a vout is above 2^32 - 1, the largest output index a transaction can name; if an array is not in the strictly ascending order section 3 gives; if validation, status.event, conflicts.kind or conflicts.scope has a value that sections 2.3 and 2.5 do not list; or if the fields disagree with one another:
    • fullyAnchored is true exactly when unresolved is empty;
    • no txid is in both anchors and unconfirmed;
    • the payment is either in anchors, with unconfirmed empty, or in unconfirmed;
    • distanceMax is null exactly when fullyAnchored is false, and distanceMin is null exactly when anchors is empty;
    • for a payment in anchors, anchors holds that entry only and both distances are 0; otherwise a fully anchored payment has an anchor, a distance that is not null is at least 1 and at most the length of unconfirmed, and distanceMin is at most distanceMax;
    • validated is within unconfirmed, and validation is the value section 2.3 gives for these lists;
    • the payment is in validated only if validated equals unconfirmed and fullyAnchored is true;
    • the txid of an unresolved entry is not in anchors, unconfirmed or validated;
    • lowestFeeRate is null exactly when validated is empty, and its bytes is at least 1;
    • status.event is mined exactly when the payment is in anchors, and status.depth is a positive integer then and null otherwise;
    • conflicts.at, when present, is at most madeAt;
    • every anchor's height is at most tip.height, and for a payment in anchors, status.depth is tip.height less the payment's anchor height, plus 1.

A reader MUST NOT take a statement to say more than its fields do. A fully anchored payment is not a mined payment. Validation all does not mean the payment will be mined. found: false does not mean that no conflicting spend exists.

6. Merkle branches in the Electrum form

The Electrum protocol's blockchain.transaction.get_merkle returns a Merkle branch as {"block_height": h, "merkle": [...], "pos": p}: the sibling hashes from the bottom of the tree up, each as hex in display byte order, and the transaction's index in the block. Electrum-protocol servers return branches in this form. A maker MAY hold paths in this form, and raw transactions held with such branches are material (section 1). A maker that converts a branch to a BRC-74 path MUST:

  1. compute the txid from the raw transaction it holds;
  2. refuse MALFORMED, and make no path, if the raw transaction does not decode completely; if the branch is not an object of exactly block_height, merkle and pos, with non-negative integers h and p (h below 2^64, since BRC-74 writes it as a VarInt) and each sibling 64 lowercase hexadecimal digits; if it has more than 64 siblings (BRC-74's limit on a tree's height); or if p is 2^n or more, where n is the number of siblings (with no sibling, p is 0). The conversion refuses nothing else;
  3. write the path with block height h and tree height n, or, with no sibling, tree height 1 and the transaction alone at offset 0, a one-transaction block. Level 0 holds the transaction at offset p with flag 02 and its txid in internal byte order, and, when n > 0, the first sibling at offset p XOR 1. Each level i from 1 to n - 1 holds sibling i at offset (p >> i) XOR 1. Nodes in a level are in ascending offset. A sibling equal to the working hash at a level where the working node's offset is even is written with flag 01 and no hash; every other sibling is written with flag 00 and its hash in internal byte order.

The conversion hashes the branch only to find those duplicates. The converted path is a Merkle path like any other: it anchors only through the checks of section 1, against the maker's own header source, so a step that hashes 64 bytes that decode as a transaction is refused ANCHOR_MISMATCH there, when the path is checked. Only the siblings, h and p are used. A maker that holds a branch and does not convert it MUST check it as if converted, with the same refusals and the same anchor. Folding the branch as the Electrum protocol does and folding the converted path give the same root.

7. Signing (optional)

A maker MAY sign the canonical bytes of a statement as a BRC-77 message. The BRC-77 serialization travels beside the statement, never inside it. A verifier checks it over the exact bytes it received; any other serialization of the same object does not verify. A signature says who made a statement and adds nothing to what the statement claims.

8. Offering statements to applications (optional)

A wallet that implements BRC-100 MAY offer one additional method, getPaymentEvidence:

  • Arguments. Either txid, a payment the wallet holds, or atomicBEEF, an Atomic BEEF (BRC-95) for the wallet to evaluate without storing it; and sign, a boolean, false when omitted. For atomicBEEF the material is that Atomic BEEF alone: the wallet's records resolve none of its inputs, so any party with the same bytes and the same headers can make the same statement. For atomicBEEF, too, status.event is received unless the payment is an anchor, whatever the wallet's records say of the payment, and conflicts is {"checked":false} or an observation made for this call.
  • Result. statement, the statement as a string, and, when sign is true, signature, the BRC-77 serialization as hex. A string keeps the bytes exact across transports that re-serialize objects.
  • Errors. A refusal is a BRC-100 error, with status "error", a code of ERR_EVIDENCE_ followed by the refusal code of section 2 (for example ERR_EVIDENCE_ANCHOR_MISMATCH), and a description; no statement is returned. For txid, a payment the wallet does not hold and a call the user has not permitted for that payment both give the code ERR_EVIDENCE_UNKNOWN_TXID with the same description. A call with neither txid nor atomicBEEF gives ERR_MISSING_PARAMETER, one with both gives ERR_CONFLICTING_PARAMETERS, and a sign that is not a boolean gives ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE, the codes BRC-100 suggests for those cases; none returns a statement.

A wallet that offers the method MUST return the statement's canonical bytes (section 4) unchanged, and its errors as above.

The method is not one of BRC-100's methods. It changes no BRC-100 argument, result, call code or default behaviour, and an application that does not call it sees no change. This document assigns it no wire call code. As BRC-100's compatibility contract requires of an unsupported extension, a wallet that does not offer the method fails the call explicitly, and that failure says nothing about the payment.

An application learns whether a wallet offers the method by calling it, never from the getVersion string (BRC-205 section 6), and a wallet that publishes a BRC-179 capability manifest declares it there as <product>.<surface>.getPaymentEvidence, at the tier of its most sensitive step.

Rationale

Two distances. The longest path is the worst case. A payment is good only if every input is good, and a short path through one input says nothing about a long path through another, so a limit on unconfirmed depth compares with distanceMax. distanceMin, the distance to the nearest anchor, exists even when some input is unresolved. On a chain the two are equal; on S5 they are 3 and 1. Carrying both lets an application see the gap.

A failed check is a refusal. A statement that recorded a failed check would rely on every application reading it correctly in order not to accept an invalid payment. A refusal cannot be misread, and it keeps none meaning "not checked".

Not checked is not failed. A validation refusal (section 2.3) says the payment cannot be mined as it stands, so it is kept for checks that ran under the consensus rules and failed. A maker's own limits, and rules its interpreter does not implement, only leave transactions out of the validated set: the statement then says less, and nothing false.

A path that does not match is a refusal. A Merkle path that leads to a root other than that of the header the maker trusts at its height is contradicted evidence: it is fabricated, or from a block the maker's chain does not hold. Treating its transaction as unconfirmed would hide that. A path above the tip, or at a height for which the header source holds no header, is neither confirmed nor contradicted, so its transaction is walked as an unconfirmed one, and a later statement may anchor it. A path that BRC-74 does not permit is wrong whatever the headers say, so it is refused before any header is read.

The own path. Two inner nodes read as a transaction are 64 bytes long, so condition (d), which never anchors a 64-byte transaction, keeps inner nodes from standing for a transaction. Condition (e) keeps a transaction from standing for inner nodes, and, like condition (a), it concerns only the steps that fold the transaction's own txid, since only those decide what the path proves about that transaction. Nodes elsewhere in a compound path are checked against one another and nothing more: a pair among them that decodes as a transaction proves nothing about this transaction either way (vector S14).

Partial material is reported. A statement exists to say what is missing, so an Atomic BEEF that lacks an ancestor is read and the gap is named. Refusing it would leave a receiver that holds partial evidence no way to say so. Bytes that are wrong in themselves, such as an unrelated entry in an Atomic BEEF, a txid twice or a path BRC-74 does not permit, are refused.

Bounds refuse. A walk cut short would report unresolved inputs for a reason a reader cannot see. A statement longer than a reader's bound is refused unread, so a maker refuses to emit one longer than its own, and one recommended value for both keeps a maker and a reader that use it in agreement.

Status apart from evidence. Broadcast, relay and mining are events the maker observes, and the evidence fields are checks it ran. Keeping them apart stops a report of the first kind standing in for the second. mined is the one status the evidence itself supports, so it is the one status derived from it. The tip is named so that a reader can check the depth, and the lock-time verdict, against its own headers.

Test Vectors

The vectors were generated from code by the reference implementation, never typed.

Common inputs: the header source is the table below and its tip is 950,010, unless a vector says otherwise; madeAt is 1793318400 (2026-10-30T00:00:00Z); the Genesis and Chronicle activation heights are mainnet's, 620,538 and 943,816, and every block here is at height 949,999 or above, so every output is created, and every input judged, under the rules in force after both; the maker's bounds are 1000 transactions, a distance of 100, 32,000,000 bytes of material and 1,000,000 bytes of statement unless a vector says otherwise; the maker validates unless a vector says "distance only"; status is received and conflicts is not checked unless a vector says otherwise; a reader's bound is 1,000,000 bytes unless a vector says otherwise. The headers are synthetic: the header source is an input of each vector, so no proof of work is needed. Every key is the secp256k1 secret SHA-256(payment evidence test vector: + label), and every signature uses RFC 6979 nonces. The keys are test keys and protect nothing.

Keys

Label Public key
payer 036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3
not the payer 0295214b460ee5aeacb289344c9a2c25070c622181bc1ac9b55436e5c3b72d0bd8
receiver 03fb1aaf51797cd0551feeeacb42dfd98be2bbcd072e6d9445d3a2620b103c3adc

Every output pays P2PKH to the payer key, and every input is signed by it with SIGHASH_ALL | SIGHASH_FORKID, except as follows. BADSIG's signature is by the not the payer key. The second output of A6 is locked with 8d5487 (OP_2MUL OP_4 OP_EQUAL), and X6 spends it with 52 (OP_2). T64 is exactly 64 bytes: its input's unlocking script is 51515151 in place of OP_TRUE, and its only output has an empty locking script, which P64 spends with 51 (OP_TRUE). TL and TLATE carry lock times given as a time, 1793002399 and 1793002400, with sequence 0xfffffffe. A transaction that carries a Merkle path spends output 0 of a transaction whose txid, in internal byte order, is SHA-256(payment evidence test vector: + its name), with the unlocking script OP_TRUE; only the conflict check of section 2.1 reads that input (vector M20). T01's output value is the first from 100,000 up that puts 01 at byte 4 of its txid in internal byte order. DS spends A1 output 0 and, with OP_TRUE, the outpoint A1 itself spends. Z4, txid 3721db44eccd6e28b0b7cb36cbab33dbdb1f8643603f4d437ace61442800466b, is spent by P4 and held by no maker. CF and CFU each have a first output of 0 satoshis locked with 006a046366747815019d57f040e087001d86955e34665a10eef59c654f, which begins 006a0463667478, so each is a confiscation transaction: CF is mined, and CFS spends its second output; CFU spends A1 output 0.

Header source

Height Block hash Header
950001 d73120d63050557443631be249d95eaaae2ee72d05375d199b9d8d33e34c5e9e 000000206b0d72cc817bdfe98bc0ccb64c9c8c0a70774fe82939b6a50cff8db0fce17353faac2f5d9533c2686ccf4c05aeb9bd51ed9e5ea108156765378a6e1209a309424002df6affff7f2000000000
950002 64a53adabc6a36de2c5176485d47e64c06f56d1b588e638ba8c7d349bdc459fc 000000209e5e4ce3338d9d9b195d37052de72eaeaa5ed949e21b634374555030d62031d790d075c6504da015e31e8b4dd7f9b3f13203f6ec553227fa499469aed264cb1a9804df6affff7f2000000000
950003 4ef4e7bfd2500d3ef2c4b89cce091e27feb0f1a82a4ceaca0395f35b9827eda7 00000020fc59c4bd49d3c7a88b638e581b6df5064ce6475d4876512cde366abcda3aa564eadfa677c67f2ba97e98f9e7df20bb5ffcffe6e0b5b1158f35af500f74943648f006df6affff7f2000000000
950004 ee55e78df915a761c888acb74bf87c5290c24af8a170e8510e7e43f6104e2916 00000020a7ed27985bf39503caea4c2aa8f1b0fe271e09ce9cb8c4f23e0d50d2bfe7f44e3fe4119fc9cc69434be8030f23c73af7ce85b9edfa54f46b2acf04894afac78f4809df6affff7f2000000000
950005 23cd77f659989d40993179d03215f98288825156a8d56b5eeec397ae4e4d275e 0000002016294e10f6437e0e51e870a1f84ac290527cf84bb7ac88c861a715f98de755eef589bf0ce95f64670549013576e136278958bd9b225891d9384b510518f0a9fda00bdf6affff7f2000000000
950006 ab14e92c0acb7212d9a1219e6c468b0f2c4ee53a7c351486bf99e916dfa1f90f 000000205e274d4eae97c3ee5e6bd5a85651828882f91532d0793199409d9859f677cd235fbc9265a1d243f9085e07d40e3c2d788cbcf9f82a3d6af6809a6612b05c6f29f80ddf6affff7f2000000000
950007 a036c06c92ea0d49b3b6862932aa4533730bcc711249099595efd41573bd33db 000000200ff9a1df16e999bf8614357c3ae54e2c0f8b466c9e21a1d91272cb0a2ce914abaf6aad4a6fc106d25c5f08419945672a02c50051e362701fe1cf22d6993ebe115010df6affff7f2000000000
950008 cd2ccdbacf490cb9b574720989e69c3a427159e3059b85fcadc6d1b04d5ed86f 00000020db33bd7315d4ef959509491271cc0b733345aa322986b6b3490dea926cc036a02bbbf06acfeea203c81dc858f5b9f865eda979478e7b1b2a70660212ad8e411ba812df6affff7f2000000000
950009 f954b173e1932e44aafc432a0171c2b4c755f11cd479cf3bae8da4d82bcb87fc 000000206fd85e4db0d1c6adfc859b05e35971423a9ce689097274b5b90c49cfbacd2ccd3bb86fd84bd65820432eb446ddb8e90be9caba4f10e4eb79a414b31066cb618f0015df6affff7f2000000000
950010 e125c62d3654c2f138f1c39bb74c56181e6d325c38844fd30cc1939d701c493a 00000020fc87cb2bd8a48dae3bcf79d41cf155c7b4c271012a43fcaa442e93e173b154f9153f4a5e0b2934460eda12e4a427a7125d11e165c771a529056b72135d2697cc5817df6affff7f2000000000

Vectors S11 and M12 use a header source that holds the 11 blocks ending at the tip: the table above plus a header at height 950000, block hash a7259cbb2bde89b111fb6b7a61f1ce9ebeb2088db84f2f1e00933598fa4e9f23:

00000020d50cbe4fa99f43bdcd39efc070f7635f17b65aa6cb99fd70be0f3b6375213c42a59eb7b873142035ddceaee8caa686bb7ece1e9ee4ab72e2ba46314439191194e8ffde6affff7f2000000000

Their median time past is 1793002400. The table alone holds no header at height 950000, so it gives no median time past.

Vector M22 uses a header source that is the table above plus the block of CF, at height 949,999, block hash 18fb1eb3ef350fad0145f44278a930e575156e6c8ebc168738328453508c6afb:

000000200b21c7e7ebd8f56f14cf86e3184298b27152624f94d981c89691a359265aba67d5a41d520d3d2ba29119cbde4eb4adc93e164d822ea42243404d87501a16466990fdde6affff7f2000000000

Transactions

Name Txid Bytes
A1 2c0746d0edc5d2afb97495acbcc4584087bdc07027360aa03b28cbf40e6ee344 01000000010ddbe8f7bd041d50ea45fa1d9abc6c62fc35e5e91cb1ef61d2c3ba08c72a75ea000000000151ffffffff01a0860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
P1 e2127516adc12a98fdc758e7d6ab36c38505cb6731f6c9b68c3cdc02b3a33896 010000000144e36e0ef4cb283ba00a362770c0bd874058c4bcac9574b9afd2c5edd046072c000000006b483045022100afd0af566d92711cc3fa91d6d1409ab41e1d4008a552760983f84dddd398c0f902205aa4926a19253ac987fce476bb8ab7aee1a14c882e0a6074fde19ab0eff4da174121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3ffffffff016e860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
A2 ecd202a719806cfd5e5a5d768878512bc440a3239e49708a7ab4ea98bc618ee6 01000000012dd251ad7d3437397d359f7c7df83f01af6c7963934222956785a790dc39d99a000000000151ffffffff01a0860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
B2 8e16699f0cd9d4b020d71caaeeed19e4a07c03f4fcdfb08c09d3f55ee594695c 0100000001e68e61bc98eab47a8a70499e23a340c42b517888765d5a5efd6c8019a702d2ec000000006a47304402207c91686d795c90eabf584a221b1e0cba9145e9e1b0c018b11e4a8b54f658f6eb02204c28638b09f98366a64030670ceae2a0137f2091fc97dd2e4cf962b9a43fc9f84121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3ffffffff016e860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
C2 04f2afb7c402d0f1d33759631f1375d95a6f641d40d554336ad5a9fba668239a 01000000015c6994e55ef5d3098cb0dffcf4037ca0e419edeeaa1cd720b0d4d90c9f69168e000000006a4730440220416b977da3d863f1dfac7509c20c589bc04c143bbe1afbad725f17fe5284edc602201da34b01f7c79181a61aa61007d948922803e90b3820ee1c3bf56850b04e7c174121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3ffffffff013c860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
D2 83a6965907f29d1b0561a9da97c7fccaf160aa38dbb2a8a5cfad4d5745362db7 01000000019a2368a6fba9d56a3354d5401d646f5ad975131f635937d3f1d002c4b7aff204000000006a4730440220732a8993c5983880684b0b66096023448fd931f0baf7b365eac4165817b6887f02202b318fc1e6dbff167395bf1df60cf1b8eaac4bd581e1829e5622c29a957bb8c54121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3ffffffff010a860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
A3 05e134ab77ba252ee5b17bc519fcfc24d23d70bf0c3f40eea65ca43ea53f61fe 0100000001c06f2aa49efe4e17440086bf32ce7ac8deb7fa67e0e6780cc11bd99e0a2c00f2000000000151ffffffff0250c30000000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac50c30000000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
B3 6a5434d9c86b7a77bfec289f42d0344ff80d904d8542f1001779cad3fabf1b00 0100000001fe613fa53ea45ca6ee403f0cbf703dd224fcfc19c57bb1e52e25ba77ab34e105000000006b483045022100ce2bc41e423c1591aa4d91dfb6c23533915be8a161cd567ac2028180231f485b0220260aafb86d9b14f5a531bc3581e5c6179afa2931373c95d62c214983d0cfdc6e4121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3ffffffff011ec30000000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
C3 96c8a32fb64394dfc9357306687db01d67c8cadd4ae7483f3123f27f8e6e48f1 0100000001001bbffad3ca791700f142854d900df84f34d0429f28ecbf777a6bc8d934546a000000006a47304402205b3a7ab7817a61107393a0db81201417e4ad5db9957d52bf8bcfeeb997affe5a022021afc250c0f0715d92b416f6d04a8343b4b9942d02f7f0427f9eb0ea0bd84ef34121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3ffffffff01ecc20000000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
P3 215984478daf11bbe5da2cd5946792e2a1247f11f644eb7ed95e49e27ce56da6 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
A4 2749e001f0e6a84653059d4a2404641852717ebd373d935d0ec80b240afd8bae 01000000017833ba4d7927e865248d4a7f845ca3b2a589f54251ada803645bdd1a22367b07000000000151ffffffff01a0860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
B4 6208df575795dfb167aabee64512316b37caf163e0d4bf67b2262cb37997a595 0100000001ae8bfd0a240bc80e5d933d37bd7e7152186404244a9d055346a8e6f001e04927000000006b4830450221009bc8d449beb818a25683dd702c185d33c884a1e62ec357f134a6ad5ca3d30fbd02204cdf06d8d1e5aa5d29ce56e79bf89749799632e47e435c58e6083c1aad8b77aa4121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3ffffffff016e860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
P4 df3f2029548cb31866c12a73d1ff6da9e3515acf66ce6c145ef34ce2e2ef9d6c 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
E5 ed1c8314bd18dfb4fd9ef30e067899b2719d6df46730470e8ae22e4c8fee67a3 0100000001635947ef12b20d2b411090d5ca4db8377624988820ec1d22fad13dcca46a6384000000000151ffffffff01a0860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
BADSIG 664569513982851cb5aefe29541ddf7de327a14206111191b9d5c07bfa59a60d 010000000144e36e0ef4cb283ba00a362770c0bd874058c4bcac9574b9afd2c5edd046072c000000006b48304502210082ac64baa07fab3df18f289ca1a8e5ebd809f641b40950640c2c0ae91875ab09022066bd7ba5ab08c7a6498db0e2ebdbce76fdc84e443416e640adf4434d56609a5c4121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3ffffffff016e860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
RICH 8b2fa28e38610df8d9038d48e1035213d8345cfbe38262c5e78159eac52297ce 010000000144e36e0ef4cb283ba00a362770c0bd874058c4bcac9574b9afd2c5edd046072c000000006a47304402205d8889878571c949d3d9367a93b628a83cdfedabc212d6a8da8424fb47fd89e90220254d3a6f57dd7093edccfb18d6ecb86cf7e6b0e34dcba89717eb2792a0b9d4b74121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3ffffffff01a1860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
LATE d35962714bdb0a3c002e03fffaae05a4700152e23bc5f795f146dedc908d92da 010000000144e36e0ef4cb283ba00a362770c0bd874058c4bcac9574b9afd2c5edd046072c000000006b483045022100931d7375eda07bac7fe325d23f826af1feb84310a51a9a72c9727c4e7f4a6c45022004fb05b964cdbb48b733eda5046246af8c994976cfa0e67065f396e373bc440b4121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3feffffff016e860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac047f0e00
X e2127516adc12a98fdc758e7d6ab36c38505cb6731f6c9b68c3cdc02b3a33896 010000000144e36e0ef4cb283ba00a362770c0bd874058c4bcac9574b9afd2c5edd046072c000000006b483045022100afd0af566d92711cc3fa91d6d1409ab41e1d4008a552760983f84dddd398c0f902205aa4926a19253ac987fce476bb8ab7aee1a14c882e0a6074fde19ab0eff4da174121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3ffffffff016e860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
Y 2db39e9d04331e1e9065267846828abea8c20c94f082f57c9a816a3bc88a2c40 010000000144e36e0ef4cb283ba00a362770c0bd874058c4bcac9574b9afd2c5edd046072c000000006b4830450221009c3b9c7117e117dd12f2028b5fc303b1977dd40768e12577cc994697b6f562cd0220388fed744f6f9b90cce9eb3ca9e5772721f1124b51489f704b880f3f5ade64204121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3ffffffff013c860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
BOTH 21a2a6decd9c12fd240a0f39b9e829471221ea15797ff3625a5b0f9fce8df64b 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
A6 a7274c4562611d5914aee0f2e991a81176f446ecde0d70eeefe6cfc6404b379b 01000000010224dd1e481f0fd12f9932799188d9482329f46571dff21bf16b6c2cad5d3845000000000151ffffffff02a0860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac50c3000000000000038d548700000000
B6 6158929cc6db06e57aad638ac4b426e53ab9dc1593e33a5b08eabcae6c26f3eb 01000000019b374b40c6cfe6efee700ddeec46f47611a891e9f2e0ae14591d6162454c27a7000000006a4730440220599490f1b3be6210bf02d60ea351275ac37363d4328673331797fd486f5cd80602205cc2658a0037268cd4aad8969a23fd411199ac4db474c3752031f51ffe87f6a64121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3ffffffff016e860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
X6 c60f7125b095b56b4c703a279599203ccee550bf33811e53617f3c8c44312690 01000000019b374b40c6cfe6efee700ddeec46f47611a891e9f2e0ae14591d6162454c27a7010000000152ffffffff011ec30000000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
P6 420adb2e2fd48ee95bae1e7e972b329a516106e6bfb1b6a321d399561822670f 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
T64 6444bf849ea4136a9608b60996cc7d552d65d94c7183ae4f71a678add2de1e02 010000000103254c9167ae1de0add271e079a00da53b5e54e6da92dffabb1ada240222f576000000000451515151ffffffff01a0860100000000000000000000
P64 23a67c1ad73128861b4741229a462f66d851e60c32e571b9fc8482d279c0f3b3 0100000001021eded2ad78a6714fae83714cd9652d557dcc9609b608966a13a49e84bf4464000000000151ffffffff016e860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
TL 525c61889807b4ba61f16c1f71f91d6ec30e794c8ff6f8727cf9b986bbc35acf 010000000144e36e0ef4cb283ba00a362770c0bd874058c4bcac9574b9afd2c5edd046072c000000006a4730440220102209fb202e103f9259e1aa1f26d7ad374dee1adcc4c82c80fcd96a59cad36f02200959f5112871a54e0cb095175a5c8412dd3fe254f6d68a0a6bec25f887d37ec54121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3feffffff016e860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac9f0bdf6a
TLATE c575cfff2bcd77600fb9f21d5708b69665aabdb98a3229ea38801664a45249b4 010000000144e36e0ef4cb283ba00a362770c0bd874058c4bcac9574b9afd2c5edd046072c000000006a47304402205dab601da164e7598ea5c65a02cfccebcd2904c8624aea6e4aa91855d5835c1b022031e3abbc37976f79b83d84e77c281b66015ae1b67e2991e5b18c75fc1c4927c14121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3feffffff016e860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988aca00bdf6a
A8 6ee90c20d3bbd231987e0573f79320f22f9f150a9fa56ec5b5802a99421cd17c 0100000001b40ed0e317387d6c4472f6f43bc4b8335e58066b8bd6953efea5f7548e8ec810000000000151ffffffff01a0860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
P8 db874543d0c2b32bfe1e38c17a15609285746d278a7abe919e334ae83ee5f98e 01000000017cd11c42992a80b5c56ea59f0a159f2ff22093f773057e9831d2bbd3200ce96e000000006a4730440220627c9d22a7b2b75d9fc4b442a7ea26e714b721c33eca95ffdde38c9ee9ffac34022058d275c5181ba8c8b3eaad8e321b447eca8ad9d59559b21d33aafd1112cd4bcb4121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3ffffffff016e860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
T01 e214b7aee5ba78b228a3ec5c14c396cf0b0cca6d668dfc79034fde0120648943 0100000001e8e99c0d85a14ac57d4253af99fc4ab39097e853fc695b4c3fba2d6d8d203906000000000151ffffffff015f870100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
P01 3641df02bc7f167afff33c58aec95af11b55df782a1a38783d19ffbb11549a94 01000000014389642001de4f0379fc8d666dca0c0bcf96c3145ceca328b278bae5aeb714e2000000006a47304402202bb6d3c07877f489109768b44b4122af671927bbce88412e9c8bd5271b923670022016e57d21e4d5f5aa20024e617524fb444d45ed78be9d559558e76b2734da39574121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3ffffffff012d870100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
DS bdd08561a7c9ab11ad839dbe9760a564c31a34bbf352371b26be942a3bba9eef 010000000244e36e0ef4cb283ba00a362770c0bd874058c4bcac9574b9afd2c5edd046072c000000006a47304402204b03fadd92054f9538b9ecf5d70f5b8fcf22a9774d4c603a8763e1783065fa31022069bc82ae9e4eefc1f4ca1f646cf3813e5c450e016c48cbf5207d4698f8351d294121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3ffffffff0ddbe8f7bd041d50ea45fa1d9abc6c62fc35e5e91cb1ef61d2c3ba08c72a75ea000000000151ffffffff016e860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
CF fe8ef6f7bc70c02f4d05e03030aea556a7342298c52c3c2841ac13aa72c1104d 010000000196c93e406e31b8c5dbfeb0e196372f821bcb4f658283102d1fd84f7cc71bab2c000000000151ffffffff0200000000000000001d006a046366747815019d57f040e087001d86955e34665a10eef59c654fa0860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
CFS 407a99aade12b75765162a6b5ff33750d4d66a076ab9b8895084a4fee5021f29 01000000014d10c172aa13ac41283c2cc5982234a756a5ae3030e0054d2fc070bcf7f68efe010000006b483045022100a1a9c4609310d2382d6d598b359db2ebac99354c30510a7616cd7a267d7519f502204fb20d0214e3b505e255b4d611114c7d9cc3af4c623a0452148a1ff66134ff804121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3ffffffff016e860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000
CFU b93c53d9615c0a2bf6f72791a41abc329d70944630f4fd5dc894fd6c5cf5418c 010000000144e36e0ef4cb283ba00a362770c0bd874058c4bcac9574b9afd2c5edd046072c000000006a4730440220506fadc65c59834c4c9d82712d3f202cdb80b9ad08061c5f5bb2232491c8253f02207f676fd420928b4443b790b5b634e441a542f3d1484197aa5fb9bdbc6c30013c4121036f1c70084d945c9cf4e48a15c90089b078c0a82d78ce6bfb0f3243e38021a6b3ffffffff0200000000000000001d006a046366747815019d57f040e087001d86955e34665a10eef59c654f6e860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac00000000

Merkle paths

Each anchored transaction is in a block of its own, as the leaf at pos; the other leaves are SHA-256(payment evidence test vector: filler + height + + index), except as follows. In the block of A8, the leaves at 2 and 3 are the first and the last 32 bytes of T64. In the block of T01, the leaf at 3 is R, 0000000000000000000451515151ffffffff0100000000000000000000000000 (internal byte order), so that T01's txid in internal byte order followed by R decodes as a transaction. The Electrum form gives pos and the siblings bottom-up; the BRC-74 path is its conversion (section 6).

Name Height pos Siblings (Electrum form) BRC-74 path
A1 950001 1 7a7f67ff94372f106ab9f59422b9280fd2b0c981e67cf8dc66e3f6cdd9bbbc49
e4152cebe7bc09be26d234fb6c435cd211e742f1447b4a47bb55c6a70581d44c
fef17e0e000202000049bcbbd9cdf6e366dcf87ce681c9b0d20f28b92294f5b96a102f3794ff677f7a010244e36e0ef4cb283ba00a362770c0bd874058c4bcac9574b9afd2c5edd046072c0101004cd48105a7c655bb474a7b44f142e711d25c436cfb34d226be09bce7eb2c15e4
A2 950002 1 0aac0a69b2a97e02a6f103a2309ca105cb715d44ddfc99cf51c74e8b28b61786
ab3baadd2384b398f79c90082741f7a55fa2570d11c7b2b10d08eef975626d31
fef27e0e00020200008617b6288b4ec751cf99fcdd445d71cb05a19c30a203f1a6027ea9b2690aac0a0102e68e61bc98eab47a8a70499e23a340c42b517888765d5a5efd6c8019a702d2ec010100316d6275f9ee080db1b2c7110d57a25fa5f7412708909cf798b38423ddaa3bab
A3 950003 1 f262106acbcd5b200ba686b689a00e1b2b874c1d79f0d9847533439edd020e0a
bf044d4fc3d0afa6a7ea035a99d55498080fadfee0f711705da8c9f8a0afe9b7
fef37e0e00020200000a0e02dd9e43337584d9f0791d4c872b1b0ea089b686a60b205bcdcb6a1062f20102fe613fa53ea45ca6ee403f0cbf703dd224fcfc19c57bb1e52e25ba77ab34e105010100b7e9afa0f8c9a85d7011f7e0fead0f089854d5995a03eaa7a6afd0c34f4d04bf
A4 950004 1 48bdce1503e9475ae3af4f2468e5d1a567aee41f50d5a6c4e2b54532abd91ed0
0b5172355c1a44629cdb6f26e4503be43a6b55498d98108defec26e1cfaf844f
fef47e0e0002020000d01ed9ab3245b5e2c4a6d5501fe4ae67a5d1e568244fafe35a47e90315cebd480102ae8bfd0a240bc80e5d933d37bd7e7152186404244a9d055346a8e6f001e049270101004f84afcfe126ecef8d10988d49556b3ae43b50e4266fdb9c62441a5c3572510b
E5 950006 4 ed1c8314bd18dfb4fd9ef30e067899b2719d6df46730470e8ae22e4c8fee67a3
6b157ae9550c8fac7e5aab7c7121162e30ae5cb397a4bd97a661df741d2fcd44
9655485f14b20de881eefc0d22692ea5c3d9b724db6afe9206fbeb30eb5885b8
fef67e0e0003020402a367ee8f4c2ee28a0e473067f46d9d71b29978060ef39efdb4df18bd14831ced0501010301010000b88558eb30ebfb0692fe6adb24b7d9c3a52e69220dfcee81e80db2145f485596
A6 950007 1 37da0e44e17db4fc7079ecdf38296b0800a963e7b5dbbc23564c5c139654e33b
96fc5df8ed76f78f4e603fccb74d461d416b8131d0a11efbe4336b51d9ad2c44
fef77e0e00020200003be35496135c4c5623bcdbb5e763a900086b2938dfec7970fcb47de1440eda3701029b374b40c6cfe6efee700ddeec46f47611a891e9f2e0ae14591d6162454c27a7010100442cadd9516b33e4fb1ea1d031816b411d464db7cc3f604e8ff776edf85dfc96
T64 950008 1 ce32ab879aec2243f097a557d39e11844730e0e7145c536d8c9e803619b13f6d
cd865c7615cc3a4059dea1d8a8c6f582579e3da49e6e7f96599eb8fe07af4696
fef87e0e00020200006d3fb11936809e8c6d535c14e7e0304784119ed357a597f04322ec9a87ab32ce0102021eded2ad78a6714fae83714cd9652d557dcc9609b608966a13a49e84bf44640101009646af07feb89e59967f6e9ea43d9e5782f5c6a8d8a1de59403acc15765c86cd
A8 950009 1 61fe9043151ceafaeb5d8c4f8ff45ba68fe1c74c4398d99ece9268c496f6222d
6444bf849ea4136a9608b60996cc7d552d65d94c7183ae4f71a678add2de1e02
fef97e0e00020200002d22f696c46892ce9ed998434cc7e18fa65bf48f4f8c5debfaea1c154390fe6101027cd11c42992a80b5c56ea59f0a159f2ff22093f773057e9831d2bbd3200ce96e010100021eded2ad78a6714fae83714cd9652d557dcc9609b608966a13a49e84bf4464
T01 950010 2 0000000000000000000000000001ffffffff5151515104000000000000000000
899ba7a5d3c9e32cf1f2068b1c59a6dd0b83b24ab979b26787cb91df12b7e68b
fefa7e0e00020202024389642001de4f0379fc8d666dca0c0bcf96c3145ceca328b278bae5aeb714e203000000000000000000000451515151ffffffff01000000000000000000000000000100008be6b712df91cb8767b279b94ab2830bdda6591c8b06f2f12ce3c9d3a5a79b89
CF 949999 1 03ea315f3d30238103cd439d76d566d1ed1b9a7b45b2aa8ad018f1cfc8f369d2
3fad8334668a72fe171a229270c0899d55a9ec45983ea45e2621e332908c9706
feef7e0e0002020000d269f3c8cff118d08aaab2457b9a1bedd166d5769d43cd038123303d5f31ea0301024d10c172aa13ac41283c2cc5982234a756a5ae3030e0054d2fc070bcf7f68efe01010006978c9032e321265ea43e9845eca9559d89c07092221a17fe728a663483ad3f

Four vectors use a path other than the conversion:

Path What it is BRC-74 path
A1-junk A1's path with two more level-0 nodes, at offsets 2 and 3, that are not the block's: the node they give at offset 1 of level 1 differs from the one the path declares there fef17e0e000204000049bcbbd9cdf6e366dcf87ce681c9b0d20f28b92294f5b96a102f3794ff677f7a010244e36e0ef4cb283ba00a362770c0bd874058c4bcac9574b9afd2c5edd046072c020026dcbc75da62047ad4739ef3256d17ddc8d615e6b3d0d8d7e40428637b76de440300b5a08be98684587105e56417da2f038e6401968d43ff1dfa5b9b77b34e1ba2dc0101004cd48105a7c655bb474a7b44f142e711d25c436cfb34d226be09bce7eb2c15e4
A1-conflict A1's block with the third transaction and its duplicate also at level 0, and at offset 1 of level 1 a hash that is not the one they give fef17e0e000204000049bcbbd9cdf6e366dcf87ce681c9b0d20f28b92294f5b96a102f3794ff677f7a010244e36e0ef4cb283ba00a362770c0bd874058c4bcac9574b9afd2c5edd046072c0202967ea168a99425d700013485381d5ba0d488e4af6e5c92d92190659a52ae94d30301010100463834cdc4f8debcc79ec98967b74db7b04209cd7f12af1104daf5508cb860c2
A8-compound A8's block whole at level 0, nothing at level 1: offsets 2 and 3 hold the two halves of T64's bytes, a pair that decodes as a transaction and is not on A8's own path fef97e0e00020400002d22f696c46892ce9ed998434cc7e18fa65bf48f4f8c5debfaea1c154390fe6101027cd11c42992a80b5c56ea59f0a159f2ff22093f773057e9831d2bbd3200ce96e0202010000000103254c9167ae1de0add271e079a00da53b5e54e6da92dffabb1ada0300240222f576000000000451515151ffffffff01a086010000000000000000000000
A2-flag A2's path with the flag of the node at offset 0 of level 0 changed from 00 to 04, which BRC-74 does not define; the hash after it is unchanged fef27e0e00020200048617b6288b4ec751cf99fcdd445d71cb05a19c30a203f1a6027ea9b2690aac0a0102e68e61bc98eab47a8a70499e23a340c42b517888765d5a5efd6c8019a702d2ec010100316d6275f9ee080db1b2c7110d57a25fa5f7412708909cf798b38423ddaa3bab

Material

An Atomic BEEF here is 01010101, the subject's txid in internal byte order, and a BRC-62 V1 BEEF (0100beef) carrying the paths listed, in order, and then the transactions listed, in order, each anchored one with the index of its path. Where a vector says V2, the BEEF is a BRC-96 V2 BEEF (0200beef) in the same order, each anchored transaction in format 01 with its path's index, each one listed as txid only in format 02, and each other in format 00. Its length and SHA-256 confirm the bytes. Records are raw transactions and Electrum-form paths, by name, from the tables above.

Statements

Equality: identical bytes of the canonical form.

S1: distance 1, every check run

  • Material: Atomic BEEF of P1: paths A1; transactions A1 (path 0), P1; 433 bytes, SHA-256 63b6ac11d00e79ad817f1942305428d0114c0ce79f0e9224cae3df1be26079f0.
  • Inputs: status handed-to-broadcaster; a conflict check at 1793318340, kind own-node, scope unconfirmed, found false.
{"anchors":[{"blockHash":"d73120d63050557443631be249d95eaaae2ee72d05375d199b9d8d33e34c5e9e","height":950001,"txid":"2c0746d0edc5d2afb97495acbcc4584087bdc07027360aa03b28cbf40e6ee344"}],"conflicts":{"at":1793318340,"checked":true,"found":false,"kind":"own-node","scope":"unconfirmed"},"distanceMax":1,"distanceMin":1,"fullyAnchored":true,"lowestFeeRate":{"bytes":192,"satoshis":50},"madeAt":1793318400,"status":{"depth":null,"event":"handed-to-broadcaster"},"tip":{"blockHash":"e125c62d3654c2f138f1c39bb74c56181e6d325c38844fd30cc1939d701c493a","height":950010},"txid":"e2127516adc12a98fdc758e7d6ab36c38505cb6731f6c9b68c3cdc02b3a33896","unconfirmed":["e2127516adc12a98fdc758e7d6ab36c38505cb6731f6c9b68c3cdc02b3a33896"],"unresolved":[],"validated":["e2127516adc12a98fdc758e7d6ab36c38505cb6731f6c9b68c3cdc02b3a33896"],"validation":"all","version":"bsv-payment-evidence/v1"}

S2: a chain of three, every check run

  • Material: Atomic BEEF of D2: paths A2; transactions A2 (path 0), B2, C2, D2; 816 bytes, SHA-256 4dfaa602f47e4720d77226c76f49576775c06442aca3a7df4a02ba9c9fa4b6ac.
{"anchors":[{"blockHash":"64a53adabc6a36de2c5176485d47e64c06f56d1b588e638ba8c7d349bdc459fc","height":950002,"txid":"ecd202a719806cfd5e5a5d768878512bc440a3239e49708a7ab4ea98bc618ee6"}],"conflicts":{"checked":false},"distanceMax":3,"distanceMin":3,"fullyAnchored":true,"lowestFeeRate":{"bytes":191,"satoshis":50},"madeAt":1793318400,"status":{"depth":null,"event":"received"},"tip":{"blockHash":"e125c62d3654c2f138f1c39bb74c56181e6d325c38844fd30cc1939d701c493a","height":950010},"txid":"83a6965907f29d1b0561a9da97c7fccaf160aa38dbb2a8a5cfad4d5745362db7","unconfirmed":["04f2afb7c402d0f1d33759631f1375d95a6f641d40d554336ad5a9fba668239a","83a6965907f29d1b0561a9da97c7fccaf160aa38dbb2a8a5cfad4d5745362db7","8e16699f0cd9d4b020d71caaeeed19e4a07c03f4fcdfb08c09d3f55ee594695c"],"unresolved":[],"validated":["04f2afb7c402d0f1d33759631f1375d95a6f641d40d554336ad5a9fba668239a","83a6965907f29d1b0561a9da97c7fccaf160aa38dbb2a8a5cfad4d5745362db7","8e16699f0cd9d4b020d71caaeeed19e4a07c03f4fcdfb08c09d3f55ee594695c"],"validation":"all","version":"bsv-payment-evidence/v1"}

S3: the same chain, distance only

  • Material: Atomic BEEF of D2: paths A2; transactions A2 (path 0), B2, C2, D2; 816 bytes, SHA-256 4dfaa602f47e4720d77226c76f49576775c06442aca3a7df4a02ba9c9fa4b6ac.
  • Inputs: distance only.
{"anchors":[{"blockHash":"64a53adabc6a36de2c5176485d47e64c06f56d1b588e638ba8c7d349bdc459fc","height":950002,"txid":"ecd202a719806cfd5e5a5d768878512bc440a3239e49708a7ab4ea98bc618ee6"}],"conflicts":{"checked":false},"distanceMax":3,"distanceMin":3,"fullyAnchored":true,"lowestFeeRate":null,"madeAt":1793318400,"status":{"depth":null,"event":"received"},"tip":{"blockHash":"e125c62d3654c2f138f1c39bb74c56181e6d325c38844fd30cc1939d701c493a","height":950010},"txid":"83a6965907f29d1b0561a9da97c7fccaf160aa38dbb2a8a5cfad4d5745362db7","unconfirmed":["04f2afb7c402d0f1d33759631f1375d95a6f641d40d554336ad5a9fba668239a","83a6965907f29d1b0561a9da97c7fccaf160aa38dbb2a8a5cfad4d5745362db7","8e16699f0cd9d4b020d71caaeeed19e4a07c03f4fcdfb08c09d3f55ee594695c"],"unresolved":[],"validated":[],"validation":"none","version":"bsv-payment-evidence/v1"}

S4: the same chain from the receiver's records, the path in Electrum form, distance only

  • Material: records: transactions A2, B2, C2, D2; the Electrum-form path of A2; payment D2.
  • Inputs: distance only.
{"anchors":[{"blockHash":"64a53adabc6a36de2c5176485d47e64c06f56d1b588e638ba8c7d349bdc459fc","height":950002,"txid":"ecd202a719806cfd5e5a5d768878512bc440a3239e49708a7ab4ea98bc618ee6"}],"conflicts":{"checked":false},"distanceMax":3,"distanceMin":3,"fullyAnchored":true,"lowestFeeRate":null,"madeAt":1793318400,"status":{"depth":null,"event":"received"},"tip":{"blockHash":"e125c62d3654c2f138f1c39bb74c56181e6d325c38844fd30cc1939d701c493a","height":950010},"txid":"83a6965907f29d1b0561a9da97c7fccaf160aa38dbb2a8a5cfad4d5745362db7","unconfirmed":["04f2afb7c402d0f1d33759631f1375d95a6f641d40d554336ad5a9fba668239a","83a6965907f29d1b0561a9da97c7fccaf160aa38dbb2a8a5cfad4d5745362db7","8e16699f0cd9d4b020d71caaeeed19e4a07c03f4fcdfb08c09d3f55ee594695c"],"unresolved":[],"validated":[],"validation":"none","version":"bsv-payment-evidence/v1"}

S5: an uneven diamond: longest path 3, shortest 1

  • Material: Atomic BEEF of P3: paths A3; transactions A3 (path 0), B3, C3, P3; 999 bytes, SHA-256 8b8bd197f55ef26145ea1fee3a87a32fd38dc98a05498f21a35fc839496d2828.
{"anchors":[{"blockHash":"4ef4e7bfd2500d3ef2c4b89cce091e27feb0f1a82a4ceaca0395f35b9827eda7","height":950003,"txid":"05e134ab77ba252ee5b17bc519fcfc24d23d70bf0c3f40eea65ca43ea53f61fe"}],"conflicts":{"checked":false},"distanceMax":3,"distanceMin":1,"fullyAnchored":true,"lowestFeeRate":{"bytes":339,"satoshis":50},"madeAt":1793318400,"status":{"depth":null,"event":"received"},"tip":{"blockHash":"e125c62d3654c2f138f1c39bb74c56181e6d325c38844fd30cc1939d701c493a","height":950010},"txid":"215984478daf11bbe5da2cd5946792e2a1247f11f644eb7ed95e49e27ce56da6","unconfirmed":["215984478daf11bbe5da2cd5946792e2a1247f11f644eb7ed95e49e27ce56da6","6a5434d9c86b7a77bfec289f42d0344ff80d904d8542f1001779cad3fabf1b00","96c8a32fb64394dfc9357306687db01d67c8cadd4ae7483f3123f27f8e6e48f1"],"unresolved":[],"validated":["215984478daf11bbe5da2cd5946792e2a1247f11f644eb7ed95e49e27ce56da6","6a5434d9c86b7a77bfec289f42d0344ff80d904d8542f1001779cad3fabf1b00","96c8a32fb64394dfc9357306687db01d67c8cadd4ae7483f3123f27f8e6e48f1"],"validation":"all","version":"bsv-payment-evidence/v1"}

S6: one input whose source is not held, every check run

  • Material: Atomic BEEF of P4: paths A4; transactions A4 (path 0), B4, P4; 773 bytes, SHA-256 54b7baac8d64b816291290e1b75c26294433be4ef89ee44328cacb45088dfa35.
{"anchors":[{"blockHash":"ee55e78df915a761c888acb74bf87c5290c24af8a170e8510e7e43f6104e2916","height":950004,"txid":"2749e001f0e6a84653059d4a2404641852717ebd373d935d0ec80b240afd8bae"}],"conflicts":{"checked":false},"distanceMax":null,"distanceMin":2,"fullyAnchored":false,"lowestFeeRate":{"bytes":192,"satoshis":50},"madeAt":1793318400,"status":{"depth":null,"event":"received"},"tip":{"blockHash":"e125c62d3654c2f138f1c39bb74c56181e6d325c38844fd30cc1939d701c493a","height":950010},"txid":"df3f2029548cb31866c12a73d1ff6da9e3515acf66ce6c145ef34ce2e2ef9d6c","unconfirmed":["6208df575795dfb167aabee64512316b37caf163e0d4bf67b2262cb37997a595","df3f2029548cb31866c12a73d1ff6da9e3515acf66ce6c145ef34ce2e2ef9d6c"],"unresolved":[{"txid":"3721db44eccd6e28b0b7cb36cbab33dbdb1f8643603f4d437ace61442800466b","vout":0}],"validated":["6208df575795dfb167aabee64512316b37caf163e0d4bf67b2262cb37997a595"],"validation":"partial","version":"bsv-payment-evidence/v1"}

S7: the same from the receiver's records, distance only

  • Material: records: transactions A4, B4, P4; the Electrum-form path of A4; payment P4.
  • Inputs: distance only.
{"anchors":[{"blockHash":"ee55e78df915a761c888acb74bf87c5290c24af8a170e8510e7e43f6104e2916","height":950004,"txid":"2749e001f0e6a84653059d4a2404641852717ebd373d935d0ec80b240afd8bae"}],"conflicts":{"checked":false},"distanceMax":null,"distanceMin":2,"fullyAnchored":false,"lowestFeeRate":null,"madeAt":1793318400,"status":{"depth":null,"event":"received"},"tip":{"blockHash":"e125c62d3654c2f138f1c39bb74c56181e6d325c38844fd30cc1939d701c493a","height":950010},"txid":"df3f2029548cb31866c12a73d1ff6da9e3515acf66ce6c145ef34ce2e2ef9d6c","unconfirmed":["6208df575795dfb167aabee64512316b37caf163e0d4bf67b2262cb37997a595","df3f2029548cb31866c12a73d1ff6da9e3515acf66ce6c145ef34ce2e2ef9d6c"],"unresolved":[{"txid":"3721db44eccd6e28b0b7cb36cbab33dbdb1f8643603f4d437ace61442800466b","vout":0}],"validated":[],"validation":"none","version":"bsv-payment-evidence/v1"}

S8: the payment is itself an anchor, its path in Electrum form

  • Material: records: transactions E5; the Electrum-form path of E5; payment E5.
{"anchors":[{"blockHash":"ab14e92c0acb7212d9a1219e6c468b0f2c4ee53a7c351486bf99e916dfa1f90f","height":950006,"txid":"ed1c8314bd18dfb4fd9ef30e067899b2719d6df46730470e8ae22e4c8fee67a3"}],"conflicts":{"checked":false},"distanceMax":0,"distanceMin":0,"fullyAnchored":true,"lowestFeeRate":null,"madeAt":1793318400,"status":{"depth":5,"event":"mined"},"tip":{"blockHash":"e125c62d3654c2f138f1c39bb74c56181e6d325c38844fd30cc1939d701c493a","height":950010},"txid":"ed1c8314bd18dfb4fd9ef30e067899b2719d6df46730470e8ae22e4c8fee67a3","unconfirmed":[],"unresolved":[],"validated":[],"validation":"all","version":"bsv-payment-evidence/v1"}

S9: a signature by the wrong key, distance only

  • Material: Atomic BEEF of BADSIG: paths A1; transactions A1 (path 0), BADSIG; 433 bytes, SHA-256 078b4cf6087ea739dd9987c131aa1f75b78383c482ccf7cc5eb9885ffe09a694.
  • Inputs: distance only.
  • Note: For a maker that has not run check 1 on this material. A maker that has run it refuses (M6) and makes no distance-only statement about it (section 2.3).
{"anchors":[{"blockHash":"d73120d63050557443631be249d95eaaae2ee72d05375d199b9d8d33e34c5e9e","height":950001,"txid":"2c0746d0edc5d2afb97495acbcc4584087bdc07027360aa03b28cbf40e6ee344"}],"conflicts":{"checked":false},"distanceMax":1,"distanceMin":1,"fullyAnchored":true,"lowestFeeRate":null,"madeAt":1793318400,"status":{"depth":null,"event":"received"},"tip":{"blockHash":"e125c62d3654c2f138f1c39bb74c56181e6d325c38844fd30cc1939d701c493a","height":950010},"txid":"664569513982851cb5aefe29541ddf7de327a14206111191b9d5c07bfa59a60d","unconfirmed":["664569513982851cb5aefe29541ddf7de327a14206111191b9d5c07bfa59a60d"],"unresolved":[],"validated":[],"validation":"none","version":"bsv-payment-evidence/v1"}

S10: a Merkle path above the header source's tip: not checked, the walk goes on

  • Material: Atomic BEEF of D2: paths A2; transactions A2 (path 0), B2, C2, D2; 816 bytes, SHA-256 4dfaa602f47e4720d77226c76f49576775c06442aca3a7df4a02ba9c9fa4b6ac.
  • Inputs: the header source is the table cut at its tip, height 950001.
{"anchors":[],"conflicts":{"checked":false},"distanceMax":null,"distanceMin":null,"fullyAnchored":false,"lowestFeeRate":null,"madeAt":1793318400,"status":{"depth":null,"event":"received"},"tip":{"blockHash":"d73120d63050557443631be249d95eaaae2ee72d05375d199b9d8d33e34c5e9e","height":950001},"txid":"83a6965907f29d1b0561a9da97c7fccaf160aa38dbb2a8a5cfad4d5745362db7","unconfirmed":["04f2afb7c402d0f1d33759631f1375d95a6f641d40d554336ad5a9fba668239a","83a6965907f29d1b0561a9da97c7fccaf160aa38dbb2a8a5cfad4d5745362db7","8e16699f0cd9d4b020d71caaeeed19e4a07c03f4fcdfb08c09d3f55ee594695c","ecd202a719806cfd5e5a5d768878512bc440a3239e49708a7ab4ea98bc618ee6"],"unresolved":[{"txid":"9ad939dc90a785679522429363796caf013ff87d7c9f357d3937347dad51d22d","vout":0}],"validated":[],"validation":"none","version":"bsv-payment-evidence/v1"}

S11: a lock time given as a time, below the median time past

  • Material: Atomic BEEF of TL: paths A1; transactions A1 (path 0), TL; 432 bytes, SHA-256 e3bd46b61095b816c1987425c42261de15430961a55a9a9a3e4468264b223291.
  • Inputs: the header source is the table plus the header at height 950000 given below it.
{"anchors":[{"blockHash":"d73120d63050557443631be249d95eaaae2ee72d05375d199b9d8d33e34c5e9e","height":950001,"txid":"2c0746d0edc5d2afb97495acbcc4584087bdc07027360aa03b28cbf40e6ee344"}],"conflicts":{"checked":false},"distanceMax":1,"distanceMin":1,"fullyAnchored":true,"lowestFeeRate":{"bytes":191,"satoshis":50},"madeAt":1793318400,"status":{"depth":null,"event":"received"},"tip":{"blockHash":"e125c62d3654c2f138f1c39bb74c56181e6d325c38844fd30cc1939d701c493a","height":950010},"txid":"525c61889807b4ba61f16c1f71f91d6ec30e794c8ff6f8727cf9b986bbc35acf","unconfirmed":["525c61889807b4ba61f16c1f71f91d6ec30e794c8ff6f8727cf9b986bbc35acf"],"unresolved":[],"validated":["525c61889807b4ba61f16c1f71f91d6ec30e794c8ff6f8727cf9b986bbc35acf"],"validation":"all","version":"bsv-payment-evidence/v1"}

S12: the same, without a header the median time past needs: left out

  • Material: Atomic BEEF of TL: paths A1; transactions A1 (path 0), TL; 432 bytes, SHA-256 e3bd46b61095b816c1987425c42261de15430961a55a9a9a3e4468264b223291.
  • Note: The header source is the table, which holds no header at height 950000, so the median time past of the 11 blocks ending at the tip cannot be computed.
{"anchors":[{"blockHash":"d73120d63050557443631be249d95eaaae2ee72d05375d199b9d8d33e34c5e9e","height":950001,"txid":"2c0746d0edc5d2afb97495acbcc4584087bdc07027360aa03b28cbf40e6ee344"}],"conflicts":{"checked":false},"distanceMax":1,"distanceMin":1,"fullyAnchored":true,"lowestFeeRate":null,"madeAt":1793318400,"status":{"depth":null,"event":"received"},"tip":{"blockHash":"e125c62d3654c2f138f1c39bb74c56181e6d325c38844fd30cc1939d701c493a","height":950010},"txid":"525c61889807b4ba61f16c1f71f91d6ec30e794c8ff6f8727cf9b986bbc35acf","unconfirmed":["525c61889807b4ba61f16c1f71f91d6ec30e794c8ff6f8727cf9b986bbc35acf"],"unresolved":[],"validated":[],"validation":"none","version":"bsv-payment-evidence/v1"}

S13: a script the maker cannot evaluate: left out, validation partial

  • Material: Atomic BEEF of P6: paths A6; transactions A6 (path 0), B6, X6, P6; 872 bytes, SHA-256 b9b3fe3ca0e6d200c60600dff944f8a4be80c74c282608bbdd7e4d21b82aeea5.
  • Note: A6 is mined at 950007, above the Chronicle activation height, so OP_2MUL (0x8d) is enabled for its output and X6's input evaluates to true under the rules in force. This vector is for a maker whose interpreter does not implement OP_2MUL, or treats it as disabled: it cannot complete the check, so it leaves X6, and P6, which spends it, out of the validated set. A maker that implements OP_2MUL validates both, and its statement differs (validation all); no vector is given for it.
{"anchors":[{"blockHash":"a036c06c92ea0d49b3b6862932aa4533730bcc711249099595efd41573bd33db","height":950007,"txid":"a7274c4562611d5914aee0f2e991a81176f446ecde0d70eeefe6cfc6404b379b"}],"conflicts":{"checked":false},"distanceMax":2,"distanceMin":2,"fullyAnchored":true,"lowestFeeRate":{"bytes":191,"satoshis":50},"madeAt":1793318400,"status":{"depth":null,"event":"received"},"tip":{"blockHash":"e125c62d3654c2f138f1c39bb74c56181e6d325c38844fd30cc1939d701c493a","height":950010},"txid":"420adb2e2fd48ee95bae1e7e972b329a516106e6bfb1b6a321d399561822670f","unconfirmed":["420adb2e2fd48ee95bae1e7e972b329a516106e6bfb1b6a321d399561822670f","6158929cc6db06e57aad638ac4b426e53ab9dc1593e33a5b08eabcae6c26f3eb","c60f7125b095b56b4c703a279599203ccee550bf33811e53617f3c8c44312690"],"unresolved":[],"validated":["6158929cc6db06e57aad638ac4b426e53ab9dc1593e33a5b08eabcae6c26f3eb"],"validation":"partial","version":"bsv-payment-evidence/v1"}

S14: a pair off the anchor's own path that decodes as a transaction: the anchor holds

  • Material: Atomic BEEF of P8: paths A8-compound; transactions A8 (path 0), P8; 466 bytes, SHA-256 1467a7df31c392303975b6ddf4268b6fb02f5b0844187d1d7d38f0c05f8b5007.
  • Note: Offsets 2 and 3 of A8's path are the two halves of T64's bytes. The fold of A8's own path hashes A8 with offset 0, then their parent with the node computed from offsets 2 and 3, and never that pair, so condition (e) holds.
{"anchors":[{"blockHash":"f954b173e1932e44aafc432a0171c2b4c755f11cd479cf3bae8da4d82bcb87fc","height":950009,"txid":"6ee90c20d3bbd231987e0573f79320f22f9f150a9fa56ec5b5802a99421cd17c"}],"conflicts":{"checked":false},"distanceMax":1,"distanceMin":1,"fullyAnchored":true,"lowestFeeRate":{"bytes":191,"satoshis":50},"madeAt":1793318400,"status":{"depth":null,"event":"received"},"tip":{"blockHash":"e125c62d3654c2f138f1c39bb74c56181e6d325c38844fd30cc1939d701c493a","height":950010},"txid":"db874543d0c2b32bfe1e38c17a15609285746d278a7abe919e334ae83ee5f98e","unconfirmed":["db874543d0c2b32bfe1e38c17a15609285746d278a7abe919e334ae83ee5f98e"],"unresolved":[],"validated":["db874543d0c2b32bfe1e38c17a15609285746d278a7abe919e334ae83ee5f98e"],"validation":"all","version":"bsv-payment-evidence/v1"}

S15: S6 as a BEEF V2 that carries Z4 by txid only

  • Material: Atomic BEEF (V2) of P4: paths A4; transactions A4 (path 0), Z4 (txid only), B4, P4; 806 bytes, SHA-256 018e960e6caeee1fa521da01bf18d91524e13f95ead1704b5557482efa19231f.
  • Note: The same statement as S6: a txid-only entry holds no transaction, so the input that spends Z4 is unresolved (section 2.1).
{"anchors":[{"blockHash":"ee55e78df915a761c888acb74bf87c5290c24af8a170e8510e7e43f6104e2916","height":950004,"txid":"2749e001f0e6a84653059d4a2404641852717ebd373d935d0ec80b240afd8bae"}],"conflicts":{"checked":false},"distanceMax":null,"distanceMin":2,"fullyAnchored":false,"lowestFeeRate":{"bytes":192,"satoshis":50},"madeAt":1793318400,"status":{"depth":null,"event":"received"},"tip":{"blockHash":"e125c62d3654c2f138f1c39bb74c56181e6d325c38844fd30cc1939d701c493a","height":950010},"txid":"df3f2029548cb31866c12a73d1ff6da9e3515acf66ce6c145ef34ce2e2ef9d6c","unconfirmed":["6208df575795dfb167aabee64512316b37caf163e0d4bf67b2262cb37997a595","df3f2029548cb31866c12a73d1ff6da9e3515acf66ce6c145ef34ce2e2ef9d6c"],"unresolved":[{"txid":"3721db44eccd6e28b0b7cb36cbab33dbdb1f8643603f4d437ace61442800466b","vout":0}],"validated":["6208df575795dfb167aabee64512316b37caf163e0d4bf67b2262cb37997a595"],"validation":"partial","version":"bsv-payment-evidence/v1"}

S16: a payment that is a confiscation transaction: left out, validation none

  • Material: Atomic BEEF of CFU: paths A1; transactions A1 (path 0), CFU; 470 bytes, SHA-256 9235e27de1c705025668181fd6113f2ad27e82952b3d8c761b4cc3d0abac0aeb.
  • Note: CFU's first output begins 006a0463667478, so CFU is a confiscation transaction, which SV Node accepts only when it is whitelisted. A maker cannot know the whitelist, so it cannot complete the checks on CFU: CFU is left out, and not refused (section 2.3).
{"anchors":[{"blockHash":"d73120d63050557443631be249d95eaaae2ee72d05375d199b9d8d33e34c5e9e","height":950001,"txid":"2c0746d0edc5d2afb97495acbcc4584087bdc07027360aa03b28cbf40e6ee344"}],"conflicts":{"checked":false},"distanceMax":1,"distanceMin":1,"fullyAnchored":true,"lowestFeeRate":null,"madeAt":1793318400,"status":{"depth":null,"event":"received"},"tip":{"blockHash":"e125c62d3654c2f138f1c39bb74c56181e6d325c38844fd30cc1939d701c493a","height":950010},"txid":"b93c53d9615c0a2bf6f72791a41abc329d70944630f4fd5dc894fd6c5cf5418c","unconfirmed":["b93c53d9615c0a2bf6f72791a41abc329d70944630f4fd5dc894fd6c5cf5418c"],"unresolved":[],"validated":[],"validation":"none","version":"bsv-payment-evidence/v1"}

Refusals by a maker

Equality: a refusal with the code shown, and no statement.

Vector Input Code Basis
M1: truncated the material of S1 without its last byte MALFORMED the last transaction ends early (BRC-62 framing); the decoder is told its input is complete
M2: trailing byte the material of S1 followed by one byte 00 MALFORMED a byte after the end of the BEEF
M3: an impossible declared length below MALFORMED 4,294,967,295 transactions declared, one present
M4: a path whose root is not the header's the material of S1 ANCHOR_MISMATCH the header at 950001 differs from the one in the header source table in the first byte of its Merkle root
M5: outputs above inputs Atomic BEEF of RICH: paths A1; transactions A1 (path 0), RICH; 432 bytes, SHA-256 3c4ae8c809029759b683a3dd737d4d54f8271415e466d561142858e6b334f5a4 VALUE_CREATED 100,001 out of 100,000 in
M6: a signature by the wrong key Atomic BEEF of BADSIG: paths A1; transactions A1 (path 0), BADSIG; 433 bytes, SHA-256 078b4cf6087ea739dd9987c131aa1f75b78383c482ccf7cc5eb9885ffe09a694 SCRIPT_FAILED the input's script does not end true
M7: a lock time not yet reached Atomic BEEF of LATE: paths A1; transactions A1 (path 0), LATE; 433 bytes, SHA-256 5de525cb23c0b6bc15f69126da6c11eaa31fe95d899e0df717f6c8d7b5f41759 PREMATURE nLockTime 950020 with sequence 0xfffffffe, judged for the block at 950011
M8: two spends of one output Atomic BEEF of BOTH: paths A1; transactions A1 (path 0), X, Y, BOTH; 967 bytes, SHA-256 92c57a32e872b06868ddbd160b269796abc19ed9c76f194f24dcb6d82006391f CONFLICT X and Y both spend A1:0
M9: more transactions than the bound the material of S2; bound of 3 transactions OVER_BOUND S2 reads four transactions; the bound is three
M10: a longer path than the bound the material of S2; bound of distance 2 OVER_BOUND S2's longest path holds three unconfirmed transactions; the bound is two
M11: a 64-byte transaction as an anchor Atomic BEEF of P64: paths T64; transactions T64 (path 0), P64; 305 bytes, SHA-256 81883aefaac00f3eedaf51ac8aaf0c8bdc12948fddd7d881dd37e54f84a20fc4 ANCHOR_MISMATCH T64 is exactly 64 bytes, so its path is no evidence (section 1, condition d)
M12: a lock time equal to the median time past Atomic BEEF of TLATE: paths A1; transactions A1 (path 0), TLATE; 432 bytes, SHA-256 9ece889c41273845d410b1caa7bfb4f16c752e7a9536c28c3e260a72426c553c; the header source is the table plus the header at height 950000 given below it PREMATURE nLockTime 1793002400 with sequence 0xfffffffe; the median time past of the 11 blocks ending at 950010 is 1793002400
M13: an Atomic BEEF over the byte bound the material of S1; bound of 432 bytes of material OVER_BOUND S1's material, the whole Atomic BEEF with its 36 bytes of prefix and subject, is 433 bytes; the bound is one byte less
M14: an Atomic BEEF with an unrelated transaction Atomic BEEF of P1: paths A1; transactions A1 (path 0), A2, P1; 520 bytes, SHA-256 ed83aeb8d4c55ed6d5bc67c5e4d6d81cb68c8ee77ab2b5d88e24d75345690765 MALFORMED A2 is neither P1 nor one of its ancestors (BRC-95)
M15: a txid twice Atomic BEEF of P1: paths A1, A1; transactions A1 (path 0), A1 (path 1), P1; 631 bytes, SHA-256 b5d7f6ac76b275499306bc10dd0a148d131ea37a1d371bbb1f789fc22d5e240d MALFORMED A1 is held twice
M16: the legacy version word the material of S1 with its BEEF version bytes 0100beef changed to efbe0001 MALFORMED efbe0001 is not a BRC-62 version
M17: a junk pair under a declared node Atomic BEEF of P1: paths A1-junk; transactions A1 (path 0), P1; 501 bytes, SHA-256 8584216fa12376a7b8937f5fbdcca91021cdf54f760a203113818231ffccf2c9 MALFORMED the path is A1-junk: the node computed at offset 1 of level 1 differs from the declared one, which BRC-74 does not permit
M18: a declared sibling that conflicts with the nodes below it Atomic BEEF of P1: paths A1-conflict; transactions A1 (path 0), P1; 469 bytes, SHA-256 cfc5192f0ad74f99d3640b28514bad911b766479ff721502df02fd4bcfe695ba MALFORMED the path is A1-conflict: the node at offset 1 of level 1, A1's own sibling there, differs from the one computed from offsets 2 and 3
M19: a level of the anchor's own path that decodes as a transaction Atomic BEEF of P01: paths T01; transactions T01 (path 0), P01; 432 bytes, SHA-256 4dc07f5aedfc3b5c57cdf7f6f9534669708da26922b20f941aa8e8553bab613c ANCHOR_MISMATCH T01's txid, in internal byte order, followed by its sibling R decodes as a 64-byte transaction (section 1, condition e)
M20: a spend of an output an anchor also spends Atomic BEEF of DS: paths A1; transactions A1 (path 0), DS; 474 bytes, SHA-256 3cfd4950db1cafd98eb99b0064935f00f353d17826ca8247b925d9d147f8f1aa CONFLICT DS spends A1:0 and the outpoint A1 itself spends, so it conflicts with a mined spend
M21: records over the byte bound records: transactions A2, B2, C2, D2; the Electrum-form path of A2; payment D2; distance only; bound of 768 bytes of material OVER_BOUND the walk reads S4's four transactions, 659 bytes, and A2's path, 110 bytes as BRC-74 bytes, 769 in all; the bound is one byte less
M22: a spend of a confiscation output before 1,000 blocks Atomic BEEF of CFS: paths CF; transactions CF (path 0), CFS; 471 bytes, SHA-256 86c50c3bb0554dd4f760df91bfdde797c28a87991e265f7858dedd25b8955589; the header source is the table plus the header at height 949999 given below it PREMATURE CF's first output begins 006a0463667478, so CF is a confiscation transaction; it is mined at 949,999, and the block after the tip, 950,011, is below 949,999 plus 1,000
M23: an undefined flag in a path no transaction names Atomic BEEF of P1: paths A1, A2-flag; transactions A1 (path 0), P1; 543 bytes, SHA-256 83ae2550985e91da512b4ad005787dbfdd9ea547383d1c2db1ac993e2f55973d MALFORMED the second path is A2-flag, which no transaction names: its flag 04 leaves the node's length unknown, so the BEEF cannot be framed (section 2.1)
M24: an Atomic BEEF with an unrelated txid-only entry Atomic BEEF (V2) of P1: paths A1; transactions A1 (path 0), A2 (txid only), P1; 466 bytes, SHA-256 636958b5367f71efb47f52d3350d6f44ae6392be70bd32bf5634dc7adace92ab MALFORMED A2's entry carries only its txid, and no input of P1 names it, so it is not an ancestor (BRC-95)
M25: a statement over the maker's bound the material of S1; status handed-to-broadcaster; a conflict check at 1793318340, kind own-node, scope unconfirmed, found false; bound of 867 bytes of statement OVER_BOUND S1's statement is 868 bytes; the maker's bound on statement length is one byte less

M3's input, in full:

0101010144e36e0ef4cb283ba00a362770c0bd874058c4bcac9574b9afd2c5edd046072c0100beef00feffffffff01000000010ddbe8f7bd041d50ea45fa1d9abc6c62fc35e5e91cb1ef61d2c3ba08c72a75ea000000000151ffffffff01a0860100000000001976a9149b0cc517962e22315ce8b46fd4fdd02db0bab31988ac0000000000

M4's header source is the table above with the header at height 950001 replaced by:

000000206b0d72cc817bdfe98bc0ccb64c9c8c0a70774fe82939b6a50cff8db0fce17353fbac2f5d9533c2686ccf4c05aeb9bd51ed9e5ea108156765378a6e1209a309424002df6affff7f2000000000

Conversion of an Electrum-form branch

The anchor of S8, transaction E5 (txid ed1c8314bd18dfb4fd9ef30e067899b2719d6df46730470e8ae22e4c8fee67a3), is at index 4 of a block of five, so its branch repeats the working hash at two levels:

{"block_height":950006,"merkle":["ed1c8314bd18dfb4fd9ef30e067899b2719d6df46730470e8ae22e4c8fee67a3","6b157ae9550c8fac7e5aab7c7121162e30ae5cb397a4bd97a661df741d2fcd44","9655485f14b20de881eefc0d22692ea5c3d9b724db6afe9206fbeb30eb5885b8"],"pos":4}

Its BRC-74 path, byte for byte:

fef67e0e0003020402a367ee8f4c2ee28a0e473067f46d9d71b29978060ef39efdb4df18bd14831ced0501010301010000b88558eb30ebfb0692fe6adb24b7d9c3a52e69220dfcee81e80db2145f485596

Level 0 holds E5 at offset 4 (flag 02) and offset 5 with flag 01; level 1 holds offset 3 with flag 01; level 2 holds offset 0 with flag 00 and its hash. The same branch with pos 12 leaves a bit over after its three siblings: refused MALFORMED. A branch of 65 siblings, its three repeated, with pos 0, is longer than any BRC-74 tree: refused MALFORMED.

Refusals by a reader

Equality: a refusal with the code shown. Each input is a change to the bytes of a statement above, S1 unless the change names another.

Vector Change Code
R1: another version the final 1 of version changed to 2, in canonical form UNKNOWN_VERSION
R2: an unexpected field a field "note":"" added, in canonical form MALFORMED_STATEMENT
R3: not the canonical form (one space) one space after {"anchors": MALFORMED_STATEMENT
R4: fields that disagree (fullyAnchored false, nothing unresolved) fullyAnchored set to false, in canonical form MALFORMED_STATEMENT
R5: conflicts.checked a number, not a boolean conflicts set to {"checked":0}, in canonical form MALFORMED_STATEMENT
R6: nested 33 deep a field x holding 32 nested empty arrays added, in canonical form MALFORMED_STATEMENT
R7: a validated transaction named as the source of an unresolved input S6 with unresolved naming B4, output 0, in canonical form MALFORMED_STATEMENT
R8: an anchor named as the source of an unresolved input S6 with unresolved naming A4, output 0, in canonical form MALFORMED_STATEMENT
R9: the payment validated, not fully anchored S6 with validated set to all of its unconfirmed, in canonical form MALFORMED_STATEMENT
R10: a key twice, the second naming another version ,"version":"bsv-payment-evidence/v2" added before the final } MALFORMED_STATEMENT
R11: the payment validated, one of its ancestors not S2 with validated holding B2 and D2 only and validation set to partial, in canonical form MALFORMED_STATEMENT
R12: a list out of order S3 with unconfirmed in descending order, in canonical form MALFORMED_STATEMENT
R13: an entry twice S6 with its unresolved entry given twice, in canonical form MALFORMED_STATEMENT
R14: a txid in capitals the anchor's txid in capital letters, in canonical form MALFORMED_STATEMENT
R15: a value section 2.5 does not list conflicts.kind set to own, in canonical form MALFORMED_STATEMENT
R16: a depth the tip does not give S8 with tip.height one more, its status.depth unchanged, in canonical form MALFORMED_STATEMENT
R17: an anchor above the tip tip.height set to one less than the anchor's height, in canonical form MALFORMED_STATEMENT
R18: over the reader's bound none; the reader's bound is 867 bytes, one less than S1's length OVER_BOUND
R19: an anchored payment with a second anchor S8 with S1's anchor added to anchors, in canonical form MALFORMED_STATEMENT
R20: one txid as two anchors a second entry for the anchor's txid, at a height one less, after the first, in canonical form MALFORMED_STATEMENT
R21: a conflict check after the statement conflicts.at set to one more than madeAt, in canonical form MALFORMED_STATEMENT
R22: an output index no transaction can name S6 with its unresolved entry's vout set to 4,294,967,296 (2^32), in canonical form MALFORMED_STATEMENT

Signature

The receiver key signs the canonical bytes of S1 as a BRC-77 message verifiable by anyone, with the key ID pinned to 571fc1f4ed6fafc9cfaa07f77e12149cd95a29f5981bb4633f6f39e47397df19 (the maker draws it at random). Equality: identical bytes.

4242330103fb1aaf51797cd0551feeeacb42dfd98be2bbcd072e6d9445d3a2620b103c3adc00571fc1f4ed6fafc9cfaa07f77e12149cd95a29f5981bb4633f6f39e47397df193045022100d6baa4f0054d9235a8f9fcdd059c83b7360f4a058e0bc397796c466323c2434a02207733ce0babc4ec3cd64200ff2843428939f0a62eb18d6b27b0b1c84b2f147ba9

It verifies over the bytes of S1, and does not verify over the bytes of R3, the same object with one space added.

Implementations

A reference implementation exists: a module of a wallet that makes a statement from an Atomic BEEF or from the wallet's records, in either mode, converts Electrum-form branches, and reads statements. Its script checks run on the interpreter of the wallet's existing BEEF verifier, the one its incoming payments pass, and it counts an input as passed only when that verifier accepts it. That interpreter predates Chronicle, so the implementation leaves out, and never refuses, a transaction whose script uses an opcode Chronicle restored or a signature with the sighash bit 0x20, or a transaction of version 2 or above whose script fails there. It does not implement the relative lock times of section 2.3, check 3, either, and leaves out a transaction that needs one.

Security Considerations

A statement is not a guarantee. A fully anchored payment with validation all has valid spends from proven coins to the payment. It can still go unmined: a conflicting spend may reach miners first, or its fee may be too low for them. A statement records evidence; the receiver's own policy decides whether to accept the payment.

Who made it. A statement says what its maker checked. An unsigned statement from the payer, or from any party with an interest in the payment being accepted, is no evidence: relying on it is relying on that party's word. A receiver makes its own statement from the material, or reads one from a maker it trusts, signed (section 7) when it has travelled.

The header source. An anchor is only as good as the header that confirms it. A source that serves headers whose proof of work nobody checked lets whoever controls it turn any Merkle path into an anchor. A maker SHOULD use headers whose proof of work it has checked. A reader of another party's statement can check the tip and each anchor's height and block hash against its own headers.

A 64-byte transaction. A block header does not say how tall the block's Merkle tree is, and the txid of a 64-byte transaction is computed as an inner node of the tree is, the double SHA-256 of 64 bytes. That allows two attacks, and the anchor definition closes each. In the first, two sibling inner nodes, read together as a transaction, have a Merkle path to the real root: whoever orders a block's transactions can search for an order in which such a pair also parses as a transaction with an output anyone can spend. Condition (d) closes it, since a 64-byte transaction is never an anchor. In the second, a real 64-byte transaction is mined, and its two halves are offered as the bottom step of a path one level taller, so that a transaction whose txid is the first half appears proven; vector M19 builds that shape, a txid with 01 at byte 4 beside a sibling that completes a transaction. Condition (e) closes it, since no step of the own path may hash 64 bytes that decode as a transaction. Neither condition alone is enough. No ordinary payment needs a 64-byte transaction, which has 4 bytes for all of its scripts together. A miner who orders a block can place beside an honest transaction a sibling it searched for, so that the transaction's path fails (e); that payment is then refused, never wrongly accepted.

Bounds. A payment can have very many ancestors, and every script costs time to evaluate. A maker bounds the material's size in bytes and the walk before it does that work (section 2.1), and a maker that evaluates scripts for others SHOULD also limit the work each script may do. Reaching such a limit leaves a transaction unvalidated; it is never a refusal (section 2.3). A statement grows with the payment, since each unconfirmed transaction and each unresolved input adds an entry: one transaction of hundreds of thousands of inputs whose sources are not held gives a statement of tens of megabytes. A maker bounds the statement it emits, and a reader the bytes it parses, at 1,000,000 bytes by default for both (sections 2.1 and 5).

Frozen outputs. SV Node refuses a transaction that spends an output on its freeze lists (validation.cpp L2596-L2607). No header carries those lists, so the checks of section 2.3 do not cover them: a validated transaction can spend a frozen output and never be mined.

Observations age. found: false held at time at, a status held at madeAt, and the depth at tip. A later conflicting spend or a later block changes none of those fields.

The method as an oracle. An application that may call the method of section 8 with any txid could learn which transactions the wallet holds, if the wallet answered calls it has not permitted otherwise than calls about a transaction it does not hold. Section 8 gives both the same error. With atomicBEEF, the status is received unless the payment is an anchor, and a conflict check is one made for that call, so the answer depends on the bytes, the wallet's headers and that check, and on nothing the wallet's records hold.

Privacy. A statement lists txids of the payment's ancestry, and a signed one links the maker's key to the payment. A maker SHOULD give a statement only to whom the user chose, such as the application that asked about that payment.

Not tested

  • No mainnet or testnet run: the vectors use synthetic headers without proof of work.
  • A second implementation, written from this document over @bsv/sdk 1.10.4, shares no code with the reference, but it reads the same vectors file and has the same author. On this revision it agrees with every vector, S1 to S16, M1 to M25 and R1 to R22, with the conversion and the signature, and with the document's own tables and material descriptions, 71 checks in all; a randomised pass over altered materials, paths, branches and statements found no fault. None has been run over the Go or Python SDKs.
  • No vector covers the maturity of a coinbase output, an output created before Genesis or before Chronicle, a relative lock time before Genesis, a transaction of version 2 or above, or a signature with the sighash bit 0x20.
  • Confiscation and freezing: M22 spends a confiscation output before it matures, and S16 leaves out a confiscation transaction. No vector spends a confiscation output once mature, and none covers a frozen output, since no maker here holds a freeze list.
  • Vector S13 is for a maker whose interpreter lacks OP_2MUL. No maker that implements it has been run on that material, and the statement such a maker would make is not given.
  • No vector holds an ancestor beyond an anchor in an Atomic BEEF.
  • No reorganisation was run. Vector M4, a header whose Merkle root differs from the path's, has the shape of one.
  • No wallet offers the method of section 8, so no application has called it, and no capability manifest has declared it. The reference implementation makes the statement for its atomicBEEF argument, without the method's errors.
  • The conversion of section 6 has not been run on branches fetched from a live Electrum-protocol server.
  • No conflicting-spend observation was made: the vectors record the fields only.
  • The bounds on statement length are exercised at one value each: the reader's in R18 and the maker's in M25.
  • No wallet that reports ancestry distance today, BREAD in ElectrumSVP included, has produced a statement.

References